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The Roots of Sexual Privacy:   
Warren and Brandeis & the Privacy of Intimate Life 
 Danielle Keats Citron*  
It is lovely to be here, especially because, as a privacy scholar, I am a bit of an 
interloper with the IP crowd.  Whenever anyone mentions IP, I think they mean 
“information privacy.”  So, in this group of intellectual property scholars, I am surely 
an outlier as well.  It is exciting to find a kindred spirit in Jennifer Rothman’s book,1 
which conceptualizes privacy as centrally involved with the formation of identity.   
What I am going to do is circle back to tell the story of Samuel Warren and Louis 
Brandeis, what they were doing in their famous law review article, how they broke 
new ground, and some of the history around the project and the writers themselves.  
Then, I am going to talk about sexual privacy, the focus on my current work. 
In writing what is now considered the most famous law review article of all time, 
Warren and Brandeis, in 1890, called for a “right to be let alone” in one’s private 
affairs.  They wrote about the indignity of the press spying on the domestic circle, 
taking photographs and publishing them without authorization.2  They objected to 
reporters’ invasive spying on family life (most pertinent to upper-crust society to 
which Warren and his wife belonged),3 and the publication of articles concerning 
people’s sexual relations.4  They warned that intimacies whispered in the family 
closet were being shouted onto the rooftops without consent.5 
Warren and Brandeis conceived of a new tort—a tort that had much in common 
with torts like assault and defamation but that deserved recognition on its own.6 The 
new tort was the right to privacy.  Warren and Brandeis explained that someone who 
sat for a photograph later published without permission could sue under copyright 
and contract law, seeking to obtain the profits from publicizing the images.  Privacy, 
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however, was about something different.7  It differed from defamation, which 
concerned damage to one’s reputation and the financial ruin that resulted from 
looking badly in other people’s eyes.8  As Warren and Brandeis explained, privacy 
involved the spiritual.9  It was not about material economic or physical harm.  They 
argued for a right to be let alone, a respect for one’s inviolate personality and the 
ability to control for oneself “one’s thoughts, communications, and sentiments.”10 
Warren and Brandeis provided an example that illustrated how privacy was a 
spiritual wrong, rather than a material one.  They imagined a husband who wrote in 
a letter to his son that he would not be dining with his wife that night.11  They 
explained that the right to decide for oneself whether others could see the letter—and 
the emotional harm that would ensue upon the nonconsensual publication of the 
letter—was the heart of the right to privacy.  Privacy  concerned the emotional harm 
that would be suffered if the letter was published without consent.  It was not about 
the letter’s market value.  No one would care about whether the man dined with his 
wife.  For Warren and Brandeis, the revelation of the letter—the publication of gossip 
about family relations—without permission invaded the right to privacy, causing 
spiritual harm.  The emotional harm was at the heart of privacy, not financial loss.  
At the time, this was fairly revolutionary.  Others had mentioned the right to 
privacy, but Warren and Brandeis developed an argument for its recognition as a 
separate tort.  Emotional harm, in the view of Warren and Brandeis, was even more 
injurious and costly to individuals and society than physical or pecuniary harms.12  
They argued for the recognition  of a right to one’s inviolate personality, a right to 
determine for oneself how much of one’s intimate life is known to others.13 
Brandeis was no foe of the First Amendment—a fact that should be obvious to 
anyone familiar with his concurrences and dissenting opinions on the subject.14  The 
last six pages of Warren and Brandeis’s article concerns exemptions to the right to 
privacy.15  In those pages Brandeis’s influence is clear.  The first exemption involves 
matters related to the public interest.  And they give the illustration of a public 
official.  Warren and Brandeis explain that private information about the domestic 
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life of a public official raises free speech concerns.16  You can see the germ of 
Brandeis’ dissents and concurrences about the First Amendment in this discussion.17 
So, what was the context out of which this article grew?  There was wonderful 
lore about Samuel Warren and his family that turned out to be wrong as Amy Gajda 
showed.18  The apocryphal story was that Sam Warren got his law partner Louis 
Brandeis to write the article with him because the press covered his daughter’s 
wedding.  Turns out, at the time of the writing of The Right to Privacy, Warren’s 
daughter was seven. Samuel Warren was the impetus for the piece but for different 
reasons.  His wife Mabel was the daughter of a U.S. Senator, and, to Warren’s 
dismay, the penny press covered their dinner parties.  Warren’s brother also was 
believed to have been gay.  If news got out about his brother’s effeminate nature and 
suspected homosexuality, the Warren family risked social ruin.19 
Warren and Brandeis articulated the notion of zones¾spiritual 
zones20¾surrounding our families and domestic lives that are important to how we 
think about ourselves, our identities, and emotional lives.   
This leads me to sexual privacy.  We should understand Warren and Brandeis’s 
project as concerning sexual privacy.  They were writing about the “invasive spying 
on the family closet;”21  the intimacies “whispered in the closet then shouted on the 
rooftops;”22  and gossip about “sexual relations.”23  Warren and Brandeis were 
talking about sexual privacy. 
Sexual privacy, as I am describing it in my forthcoming work and book project, 
is about the social norms governing how we manage the boundaries around our 
intimate lives.24  So, sexual privacy concerns sex, but not just sex. Sexual privacy 
concerns the concealment of naked bodies and intimate activities including, but not 
limited to, sexual intercourse.  It involves personal decisions about intimate life, such 
as whether to entrust others with information about one’s sexuality or gender, or 
whether to expose one’s body to others.  Sexual privacy relates to communications 
between intimates about sex, sexuality, or gender.  Warren and Brandeis wrote about 
sexual privacy—the interactions and communications of intimate partners as well as 
the spheres in which intimacy occurs.  
Sexual privacy should be given, in my view, normative priority over other 
competing privacy claims.  The question is why.  And this is where Jennifer Rothman 
and I have much in common—the importance of sexual privacy to autonomy and 
 
 16. See id. at 216.  Note that, at the time, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) 
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 17. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Pierce v. 
United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
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 20. See notes 25–27, infra.  
 21. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 195. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 196. 
 24. See Danielle Keats Citron, Sexual Privacy, 128 Yale L.J. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 8–
10), available at https://perma.cc/FQQ7-MMK6.  
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identity formation.  Without sexual privacy, we do not get the chance to go backstage 
and experiment with our naked bodies, sexuality, and gender identities.  Before we 
go onstage, as Erving Goffman would explain, we need to experiment backstage.25  
We need sexual privacy for identity formation because of the self-respect that it 
affords us.  It says to us that we are in charge of how much others know about us.   
Janet Mock, a transgender writer, writes in her autobiography about when she 
came from Hawaii and moved to New York.26  At the time, she had already become 
a woman--leaving “Charles” behind and becoming “Janet.”  She writes that when 
she came to New York, she did not want to have to tell her colleagues and people 
she randomly met about her trans woman-ness.  She did not want to be seen as just a 
trans woman. Janet wanted to control what other people knew about her.  She wanted 
to control that crucial piece of her identity, which, if known, might overwhelm how 
everyone saw her.  Janet sought a sense of self-respect and, as Robert Post would 
describe it, the social basis for respect.27   
As highlighted in Warren and Brandeis’s piece, sexual privacy is important to 
intimacy and the forging of intimate relationships.  Without sexual privacy, we 
cannot engage in mutual self-disclosure and mutual vulnerability.  The reason we 
allow ourselves to be vulnerable with intimates is because we trust that they will keep 
our confidences.  Sexual privacy is essential to forge intimate relationships.  Without 
privacy, as Charles Fried would argue, we cannot have intimate relationships.28  It is 
the essential precondition to love; it is the oxygen for intimate relationships. 
Consider the case of Annie Seifullah who served as a school principal in Long 
Island City.29  She had been previously married and at her house she had an old 
computer that was not password protected.  On the computer, she had pictures she 
had taken with her ex-husband that showed her in lingerie.30  Some were nude photos.  
After splitting from her ex, Annie lived with another man.  She never showed the 
photos to the man, but when they broke up he took the old computer, copied the 
photos and put them on her Department of Education laptop.31  He showed the photos 
on the laptop to Seifullah’s supervisor.  He sent the photos to the New York Post32 
and posted them on Twitter. Annie lost her job.  As she described to me, after the 
photos were splashed in the paper and online, she felt that she could no longer define 
her identity for herself.  She was devastated that she was now the slutty teacher 
appearing in lingerie in the New York Post.33 
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The parallels I want to draw—the importance of privacy to identity formation-- 
bring us back to Warren and Brandeis, to rethink why we care about privacy.  Crucial 
is emotional harm resulting from the denial of sexual autonomy and human agency. 
It is the profound sense of shame when someone’s nude photos are posted online.  It 
concerns the damage to human dignity and to intimacy.  Hence the difference in the 
right to publicity, which concerns financial harm and the market value of one’s 
identity.  Privacy is crucial but it is not about protecting the right to sell it.  
 
